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The two most significant studies made by the Presidential Railroad
Commission concern manpower in operating classifications and the
wage structure.' Irrespective of how one appraises the Commission's
recommendations (and there are its supporters and detractors), it is
agreed that these two studies provide significant new information to
economists, government agencies, and the carriers and brotherhoods.
In an industry as old as railroading, regulated in detail by government
agencies and with a long history of collective bargaining, it is portentous
that such large gaps could have existed in our information regarding
the manpower profile and the wage structure of operating employees.
The Commission was in complete accord in its direction of the studies,
and the methods used were approved by experts representing the
carriers, the brotherhoods, and governmental agencies.Thus, the
studies possess both a high degree of technical competence and wide-
spread confidence.
This paper is concerned solely with manpower problems, despite
the greater richness and novelty of the wage data and my own pro-
fessional interest in wage structure issues.The wage structure of
operating employees isso distinctive and involves such grotesque
inequities2 that discussion of its problems has relatively little general
relevance except as another instance of a "demoralized" incentive
'The Commission was established by Executive Order 10891 in accordance with
the agreement of October 17, 1960, between the carriers and the five operating
brotherhoods. The Reportof the Presidential Railroad commission waspresented
to the President on February 26, 1962. The reports are StudiesRelating to Railroad
Operating Employees, Employment Trends and Manpower Characteristics of Railroad
Operating Employees, Reportof the Commission, February 1962, Washington,
Appendix III, pp. 1—105, and PayStructure Study, Railroad Operailng Employees,
Reportof the Commission, February 1962, Washington, Appendix II.
2SeeReportof the Railroad Commission, Chaps.8,9.424 MANPOWER IN RR OPERATING CLASSIFICATIONS
system. The manpower study appears to have a wider range of ap-
plicability not only in transportation but in industry more generally.
Manpower Study
Employment in the railroad industry has been declining over the past
forty years, except for the period of World War II.Average annual
employment of Class I railroads was 2.0 million in 1920, 1.5 million in
1930, 1.0 million in 1940, and 780,000 in 1960. The 1961 figure was
716,000, and that for 1962 may be expected to be below 700,000. This
is a decline of over 60 per cent in forty years.
Operating employment on Class I railroads declined from 366,000
to 261,000 in the postwar years 1948—59. This decline of 29 per cent
was at a lesser rate than the 47 per cent decline of total employment
on these roads, reflecting the larger decline in nonoperating employ-
ment. In the postwar period, the number of railroad employees at-
tached to the industry (Railroad Retirement Board data) declined at a
more rapid rate than the number of railroad jobs (Interstate Commerce
Commission data) as certain employees, particularly in nonoperating
and lower-seniority categories, left the industry.
The Commission started its work with the conviction that a careful
manpower profile of the work force was a prerequisite to any policy
prescription in an industry with forty years of secularly declining
employment, and faced with further market competition, additional
labor-saving technological change, a merger movement among carriers,
and disputes over work rules that concerned manning schedules.It
was not enough to project a continued decline in average employment
or attachment to the industry; it was imperative to be informed of the
age distribution, length of service, and other characteristics of em-
ployees in various occupations and types and grades of service, and
also to know the rationale of hiring rates and separation rates. The
study of manpower was designed to tabulate and analyze data on
these characteristics of the work force in the operating classifications.
The railroad retirement system uniquely provides data on the man-
power of the railroad industry. (Data in such detail are not available
by occupations for other industries.) The Commission arranged for
universe counts of operating employment, new entrants, and retire-
ments; it secured 4 per cent samples of data relating to age, service,
death, and withdrawals, and 2 per cent samples of unemployment and
sickness beneficiaries. These tabulations were generally made for the
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occupationsin January of each year contain a great deal more detailed
information than the mid-month employment counts derived from
the ICC M-300 report forms reflecting the number of jobs.3 For the
year 1959, the RRB data showed a total of 260,952 employees attached
to operating classifications as compared with 210,673, the average of the
mid-month count from ICC reports.
It would be impractical to summarize here the rich statistical detail
this manpower study makes available, but four illustrations will show
the relevance of the data to manpower planning and policy making.
1. The median age in 1959 of the major operating occupations was
as follows:engineers, 59;firemen (helpers), 42;conductors, 53;
brakemen, 41.The age distribution within each occupation adds
important information. The percentage distribution figures for en-
gineers (35,525)andfiremen (67,000), for instance, were as follows.
Age DistributionEngineers Firemen












75 and over .9 .1
SOURCE: Report of the Railroad Commission,
Appendix 111, Table 15.
Thus, 22.1 per cent of the engineers, or 7,850, were over 65 years of
age; another 23.6 per cent, or 8,384, were between 60 and 64 years.
The distribution of firemen shows that 7.0 per cent, or 4,690, were
under 25 years of age and another 9.1 per cent, or 6,097, between 25
and 29 years.Such details can be elaborated into distributions by
See Technical Note, "Comparability of Railroad Retirement Board and Inter-
state CommerceCommission Employment Statistics,"Reportof theRailroad
C'o,nmission, Appendix HI,pp.10—11.426 MANPOWER IN RR OPERATING CLASSIFICATIONS
branch of service, such as road and yard, passenger and freight, and
other categories. Age distributions are dearly vital to consideration
of manpower policy-making in an industry with a history of sharply
declining employment.
2. The length of service of employees by occupation, type, and
grade of service as well as by age distribution is another dimension of
the work force measured by the manpower study. The percentage
distribution of years of service4 completed at the end of the same
year (1959) by the same employees (engineers and firemen) are shown
as follows.









40 and over 26.7 3.2
SOURCE: Reportof the Railroad Commission,
AppendixIII, Table 17.
Thus, 31.6 per cent of all firemen had less than ten years and 17.8 per
cent less than five years of service, while 26.7 per cent of all engineers
had forty years of service and more.
Tabulations by length of service and age distribution for 1959 show
that, of the 11,950 firemen defined as attached to the industry with less
than five years of service, 670 (5.6 per cent) were less than 20 years old;
8,300 (69.5 per cent) were in the 20—29 age group. Among the 9,225
with five to nine years of service, 1,800 (19.5 per cent) were in the 20—29
age bracket.However, when one considers the bracket of ten to
fourteen years of service, as might be expected, virtually no one was
under 30 years of age.5Since industrial societies often measure at-
tachment and equities in jobs by length of service and age, the detailed
A year of service is equal to twelve months of cumulated compensated service;
a month of service is any calendar month in which compensated service of any
amount, creditable under the Railroad Retirement Act, is completed.
Report of the Railroad Commission, AppendixHI, Table 18.MANPOWER IN RR OPERATING CLASSIFICATIONS 427
data presented in this manpower study are essential to private and
public policy-making.
3. The study shows that, even though the number of employees in
operating classifications had decreased steadily from 366,000 in 1948 to
261,000 in 1959, there were in that year 8,934 new entrants with no
previous railroad experience.The firemen classification recruited
2,455, or 27.5percent, of the new recruits alone.
4. The study also analyzes closely the annual separation rates for
operating employees in recent years in regard to the effects of retire-
ments, deaths, and withdrawals. The tabulations are available by age
and occupation. They are essential to any careful projections of the
work force and to building various models of adjustment in manpower
to projected changes in demand and manning schedules. Thus the
number of vacancies available to firemen or trainmen in the next five
or ten years will depend upon the projected separation rates—retire-
ments, deaths, and withdrawals—not only in the immediate clas-
sifications but even more in the engineer and conductor classifications,
which are the next step in the promotion ladder.
This section has been designed to call attention to the rich source
of raw materials made available in the manpower study of the Pres-
idential Railroad Commission. Study of them can serve as a pattern
for a number of industries, such as maritime, printing, and basic
steel, which face continued long-term contraction in employment.6
The railroad manpower study was greatly facilitated by the specialized
data made available through the railroad retirement system, and com-
parable studies in other segments will require extensive collection of
new information. Tt is imperative that studies be begun in these other




The widespread newspaper publicity campaigns on technological
change—or the lack of it—in the railroad industry and the emotional
changes surrounding "featherbedding" have materially complicated
reasoned public discussion of adjustment to change not only in railroads
but in industry generally.While railroad managements were divided
to some degree on the advisability oF these campaigns, partly because
Ewan Clague and Leon Greenberg, "Emptoyrnent," in John T. Dunlop, ed.,
Autoinatlo', and Technolo4ca1 Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,1962, pp. 114—131.428 MANPOWER IN RR OPERATING CLASSIFICATIONS
morale of employees and efficiency would be adversely affected, the
publicity campaigns reflected managerial judgment that their previous
attempts to negotiate in collective bargaining had not been successful
and that further attempts could only succeed in the spotlight of an
aroused public opinion.
The labor organizations were understandably concerned that this
campaign so prejudiced many segments of public opinion thatit
would be difficult to secure a fair hearing even before informed neutrals,
that their subsequent bargaining position had been adversely affected,
and that public opinion had been emotionally prejudiced. Nor did
the contemporaneous flight-engineer problems help to secure a sym-
pathetic public reaction. The railroad brotherhoods resented the fact
that their resources for public countercampaigns were small. Despite
some pioneering activities, they tended, by and large, in this hostile
environment to stimulate their memberships to resistance rather than
to the need for accommodation.
This sort of atmosphere in the newspapers is suitable neither for
constructive problem solving at the bargaining table nor even for
scholarly discussion.In view of the state of public feeling on these
questions relating to the railroads, itis essential to devote a brief
section to technological change and collective bargaining more gener-
ally, and to identify the special circumstances that have aggravated the
railroad situation. This discussion is designed to place railroad prob-
lems in a more dispassionate setting. Two general propositions are
asserted.
The first is that, on balance, collective bargaining has stimulated
rather than retarded the rate of technological change.7Collective
bargaining has requlied top managements to pay greater attention
to the work place and to the managerial line of communication to and
from the first level of supervision. Labor organizations have placed
managements under strong pressure to seek greater efficiencies and
cost reduction. Agreements in most industries provide, in the event
of a dispute, for managements to make technological changes and a
variety of adjustments in job asssignments, wage structure, benefits,
safety, and other conditions of work, through an orderly grievance
procedure without resort to work stoppages.Labor organizations
have typically emphasized the need for broad training in a work force.
There are notable exceptions to this proposition and some agreements
have developed significant rigidities, but they should not be allowed
Sumner H.Slichter,James J.Healy, and Robert E. Livernash, The Impact of
Collective on Manaçemeist, Washington, 1960, pp. 342—371, 946—961.MANPOWER IN RR OPERATING CLASSIFICATIONS 429
to distort the general picture.Indeed, the exceptions call for ex-
planation.
The second proposition is to remind ourselves that resistance to
technological change is widespread in the community and not the
distinctive attitude of any group. "Turnpike companies profiting from
tolls, and owners of stage coaches were among the most active op-
ponents of railroads. They were supported by tavernkeepers along
the route of the roads, and by farmers who felt that the introduction
of the railroads would deprive them of markets for horses and for
hay." 8Therailroads may have been more sophisticated but probably
no more charitable toward their latter-day competitors (the Panama
Canal, the St. Lawrence Seaway, the pipelines, the trucks, and the
airlines). There are certain human qualities which suggest that attitudes
and responses depend, at least in part, upon whose ox is being gored.
Moreover, Professor George Taylor wisely reminds us, "It is a sign
of the times, perhaps, that the short-shrift treatment is so largely confined
to those rules which benefit hourly paid workers while work rules
prevalent in the professions, including college teaching with its tenure
appointments, are more sympathetically viewed."Efficiency needs
to be weighed against other values.
In the light of these general propositions, the question arises of the
reasons for the failure of the railroad industry to make a more orderly
and rapid adjustment to technological changes, particularly with regard
to various work rules relating to the use of manpower.Collective
bargaining developed early in this industry, and the statesmanship of
leaders on both sides was widely acclaimed. While there is a tendency
among outsiders to minimize the extent of the change in technology
that has in fact taken place in the past decade, and to fail to appreciate
the degree of accommodation to it on particular railroads, the problem
remains a significant one with many facets. These include the recruit-
ment and development of managements, managerial methods and
techniques, availability of capital, and government regulatory policies
aside from the collective bargaining arrangements. The quest here is
for the more proximate factors.
It has sometimes been said that the craft organization of railroad
operating employees primarily accounts for their policies toward work
rules and manning schedules. This is a temptingly easy solution and
SNational Resources Committee,Technological Trends and National Policy,
Washington,June 1937.
George Taylor, Bargaining," in John T. Dunlop, ed., Automation
andTechnological NewYork, 1962, p.94.430 MANPOWER IN RR OPERATING CLASSIFICATIONS
congenial to economists since it relies on the inelasticity of demand
for a single craft. While the form of organization and the bargaining
arrangements do play a role, as will be indicated, the craft explanation
is not very significant or perceptive.Thus, the same diesel engine
which so drastically altered the work operations of the fireman (helper)
also virtually eliminated the boilermaker from the railroad shops.
This change eliminated almost 50,000 jobs in the postwar period and
caused some difficult adjustments in the structure of the Boilermakers'
Union, at least in railroads. But this sweeping change was accomplished
without serious dispute or public notice. A number of contrasts
between the situation involving the fireman and the boilermaker are
most instructive.
The boilermakers had a craft which was transferable to other in-
dustries, but the skills of operating employees have little use outside
their industry. The boilermakers often were able to command as high
or even higher compensation in construction, shipbuilding, and boiler-
manufacturing enterprises.It is hard to discover jobs in industry
which would provide annual incomes to match those of operating
railroad personnel with skills of little transfer value. The Boilermakers'
Union is engaged in a number of industries and could directly facilitate
the transfer of displaced workers through knowledge of job oppor-
tunities, hiring arrangements, and personal contacts.The railroad
operating unions have few collective bargaining relationships outside
the railroad industry. The disappearance of the jobs of boilermakers
on the railroads did not involve the threat of disappearance of the
union as an organization. The railroad operating unions, however, are
tied almost exclusively to railroads. While the work operations and
the jurisdiction of boilermakers were defined in scope rules, there was
no collective bargaining provision or state law establishing a manning
rule for boilermakers or providing for the employment of so many
boilermakers in each shop. In contrast, the national diesel agreement
of 1937 requires the use of firemen, and various state laws prescribe
the size of the train crew. Finally, the boilermakers were not confronted
by a rival union in their jurisdiction, nor did they share a promotion
ladder with another craft, as in the case of the firemen and engineers.'0
It is the combination of these various factors which is responsible for
the differences in adjustment of two crafts to the same technological
change.
10GeorgeR. Horton andH.Ellsworth Steele, "Unity of the American Railroad
Engineers and Firemen," Industrialand Labor Relations Review, October1956, pp.
48—69.MANPOWER IN RR OPERATING CLASSIFICATIONS 431
in general terms, the degree of difficulty in adjusting manpower to
technological change can be related to five factors. Their identification
willassistin locating the sectors of the economy which may involve
most problems in adjustment to change.
1. A sector with long-term decline in employment magnifies the
problems of adjustment.
2. A high degree of turnover, as is typically the case in occupations
characterized by women employees, or in industries with casual employ-
ment, tends to mitigate the severity of adjustment problems. The
long-term attachment of men in railroads complicates the task of
adjustment.
3. Occupations with specialized skill, as among railroad operating
employees, compared to skills with wide transfer value, involve
greaterproblems,particularlywhen wagesarerelativelyhigh
compared toother wages inthe communities in which many
operating railroad workers live.Employees are often required to
make changes in both location and occupation to secure alternative
employment.
4. The concentration of a union in a single craft in a single industry
makes adjustment more difficult in the face of adverse technological
change, since the question of institutional survival of the labor organ-
ization complicates adjustments. Merger among labor organizations
in the railroad industry, as in others, has proven most difficult. The
problems are magnified by the fact that ladders of promotion, such as
fireman and engineer, are served by rival unions, and work rules and
seniority arrangements defining work opportunities between the crafts
on the same ladder impede merger. Further, the future of the labor
organization, its officers, and its bargaining rights are at stake in
addition to jobs. Labor organizations confront budgets also, and when
employment and dues have fallen below a certain level the organization
may cease to be financially viable.
5.Theinclusion of explicit manning rules in collective bargaining
agreements or in state statutes or regulations further complicates ad-
justments since such rules become symbolic and often provide a barrier
to review of new technological possibilities. Moreover, a single national
rule is likely to prove more difficult than a variety of locally bargained
rules which permit local experimentation with new processes and
a variety of compromises.There has been little opportunity for
local or regional experimentation on firemen questions, although
there has been much more variation in the case of rules on crew
composition.432 MANPOWER IN RR OPERATING CLASSIFICATIONS
Policiesto Facilitate Manpower Adjustments
Thelesson of history isclearly that work rules cannot for long
frustrate technological change. The labor movement early learned
that a policy of obstruction'1 could not succeed.In the language of
President Perkins of the Cigar Workers: "No power on earth can stop
the at least gradual introduction and use of improved machinery and
progressive methods of production." Matthew Woll stated in 1929
the position of the labor movement: "It is not the function of the
labor movement to resist the machine.It is the function of the labor
movement to turn the installation of machinery to the good of the
workers."
The central problem of collective bargaining raised by technological
change is, accordingly, accommodation to the change. These problems
are most acute in the types of situations identified by the list of five
factors noted in the last section.Irrespective of the wider effects of a
particular change on the economy as a whole, technology does destroy
or erode job opportunities and skills for particular groups; this destruc-
tion is analogous to the destruction of capital values and rents. in an
advanced industrial society the task is to design procedures to secure
orderly adaptation to continuous change rather than to fight through
an isolated technological change.
Economists tend to think of the flow and direction of manpower
solely in terms of the concept of the labor market. While concern
with the labor market is appropriate, it involves only a portion of the
relevant flows of manpower in the economy. A more complete analysis
of labor flows requires equal attention to the flows of manpower
within enterprises or other units established by collective bargaining,
and also the relations between such internal flows and the exterior
markets.
Itis appropriate, perhaps, to emphasize the importance of this
concept to economists. The flow of manpower within a unit, and to
and from the exterior market, is largely regulated by a series of rules of
the work place affecting ladders of promotion, seniority districts, over-
time allocation, work allocation, manning rules, retirement, and the
like, as well as by the internal wage rate structure. Thus, the rules
governing the definition of seniority districts and the criteria for layoffs
will determine whether employees are discharged from the enterprise
"SumnerH. Slichter, Un/a,: Policies and Industrial Management,Washington,
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and returned to the exterior labor market or whether they remain
partially employed or attached to the enterprise. Moreover, these rules
determine which particular employees are affected.Still other rules
will determine the rights to promotion, the division of overtime or other
work opportunities, and other flows of manpower within the enterprise
or other units. Further, narrow seniority districts may result in hiring
new workers from the exterior market while other workers are on layoff
status in other seniority districts. Any attention to the efficient al-
location of the labor force must involve both the traditional exterior
labor market and the rules directing the internal flows of manpower
and their interchange with the exterior market.
The significant question of policy concerns the measures that can be
taken to increase the effective use of manpower already attached to the
industry and to provide an orderly adjustment of manpower to tech-
nological and market changes in prospect. The following measures
may be suggested to apply to manpower in operating classifications
in the railroads.
I. There is need to broaden seniority districts and even to create
new carrier-wide or even industry-wide pools or lists so that employees,
particularly of long service, are given rights to employment elsewhere
on a railroad or even elsewhere in an industry on other carriers before
new people are hired.In an industry with declining employment
totals, it is less than a rational use of manpower to continue to attract
and to train new employees to very specialized jobs while other workers,
often older with these same skills, are being released permanently.
One of the significant features of the Kaiser-Steelworkers plan provides
for a plantwide labor pooi below the separate departmental seniority
districts. The Commission proposed such a national roster for firemen
separated or furloughed as a result of its recommendations. But wider
seniority districts are generally required, particularly with regard to
permanent layoffs.
2. An industry with declining employment totals should gradually
adopt a program of compulsory retirement at age 65.Thispolicy is
the more appropriate in an industry with adequate or even generous
pension or retirement benefits as compared to industry generally. In an
industry with 22.1 per cent of the engineers and 15.8 per cent of the
conductors over 65,revisedretirement policies should play a role in the
necessary adjustment of manpower to further technological change.
It may well be that the gradual adoption of a compulsory retirement
program, starting at age 70 and working down to 65,shouldbe as-
sociated with some increase in retirement benefits to encourage even434 MANPOWER IN RR OPERATING CLASSIFICATIONS
earlier retirement in some cases.These suggestions are opposed by
senior men who have spent a long time looking forward to the op-
portunity of choosing certain select runs which provide considerable
overtime or short hours of work. But a retirement program has none-
theless a major contribution to make in the adjustment of manpower
to changes taking place in the railroad industry.
3. Changes in the hours of work of certain operating employees,
particularly in local freight service, also have a contribution to make to
more orderly manpower adjustments. Among local freight engineers,
75.5 per cent worked forty hours or more a week, 60 per cent fifty
hours or more, 34 per cent sixty hours or more, and 15.1 per cent
70 hours or more. In contrast, 53.9 per cent of through-freight en-
gineers worked less than thirty hours a week, another 24.7 per cent
between thirty and forty hours, a further 14 per cent between forty and
fifty hours, and only 7.4 per cent over fifty hours a week.12 While these
hours are related to the wage system and other rules, it is clear that one
way to adjust to employment declines is to provide in local freight
service for lower weekly hours of work for some employees with the
longest hours, even at the expense of weekly earnings.
4. An industry which has highly specialized jobs and a long-term
record of declining employment has an obligation to encourage the
retraining of its labor force.Programs should be made available
particularly to employees in the age brackets below 30 years, who have
least seniority, are more vulnerable to unemployment, and are also
most likely to move voluntarily. There may well be a case for sharing
costs between the industry and the community, but it is imperative
to a manpower policy to encourage such training while workers have
jobs rather than to defer training until they are unemployed.
5. The.proposal has been made by a number of labor organizations
and adopted in some agreements that the orderly adjustment of man-
power to further technological changes in the railroad industry requires
the adoption of some limitation on the right of management to abolish
positions. In some instances the proposal is for a "controlled attrition
approach," as in the Southern Pacific agreement with the Order of
Railroad Telegraphers, under which the rate of job abolition is limited
to natural attrition or a fixed percentage of the working force, whichever
is less. This approach, it has been said, protects something more than
people; it protects the job itself.In other instances the proposal is for
the limit of "natural attrition," which restricts the rate ofjob elimination
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to the rate of labor turnover resulting from death, retirement, resigna-
tion, discharge for cause, and possible promotion outside the bar-
gaining unit.'3
In the language of Emergency Board 151, "The only appropriate
objective of natural attrition consonant with public policy is the leveling
of peaks and valleys of employment, not the impeding of necessary in-
novation. Meaningful employment security cannot be achieved at the
expense of change. The goal of a natural attrition program should be
to assure that technological and organizational change will be in-
troduced on a planned, orderly basis, and its result should be an average
level of employment no higher than would be the caseinits
absence."
in some circumstances an attrition program may be a useful con-
tribution to a manpower program in an industry faced with continuing
technological change. But it is not a universal or general-purpose tool.
Some industries and companies are expanding as others are contracting;
some have higher natural attrition rates than others, depending on the
proportion of women employees, age composition, location, and other
factors;some have a higher proportion of temporary employees
typically excluded from any attrition program. It may not always be
feasible or practical to distinguish between changes in employment
attributable to variable output and economic conditions and changes
in employment directly related to new technology or new methods.
An attrition program may be effectively frustrated by seniority rules
which permit little or no transfers among related jobs. An attrition
program confined to a single occupation may have little purpose other
than to restrict the rate of introduction of technological change. A
program of attrition may be applied to a group of employees above a
certain age or with longer service records, rather than to all employees.
The Presidential Railroad Commission proposed such a program for
firemen in other than passenger service.Thus, its appropriateness
must be examined separately in each situation.
6. Manpower displaced by technological change should be provided
a schedule of lump-sum payments or weekly benefits, above normal
unemployment compensation, to facilitate transfer to new jobs and
locations and in partial compensation for the loss of preferred positions
and economic rents. This principle has now come to be recognized as
the first requisite to orderly adjustment of manpower. The benefits
should be higher the longer the period of service.
13Seethe excellent discussion of Emergency Board 151, December 31, 1962, pp.
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In view of a continued decline in demand, these policies are designed
to facilitate a more orderly withdrawal of labor resources from op-
erating classifications, to discourage unnecessary new recruitments, and
to use more effectively the labor force remaining in these occupations
in the industry.
COMMENT
GEORGE WILSON, Indiana University
Dunlop's treatment of railroad-industry problems differs from that
of other contributors to this volume in that it is more narrowly based.
His immediate goal is to help effect an orderly transition of internal
labor flows in the railroad industry in the face of a combination of
technological change and a relative decline in the demand for railway
service. This is a vexing problem but at least it is specific.It lends itself
to political compromise on behalf of union and management, assuming
emotions can be held in check. In the long run the ultimate solution is
clear. We can only question the way in which it should be effected. This
question does not require any sophisticated analysis of economically
optimal solutions.Rather, the problem is to devise a pattern of ad-
justment which both sides will find acceptable.
But Dunlop is not content merely to summarize a program for
orderly readjustment. He is concerned as well with why adjustment
has been so difficult in the case of firemen and engineers.I find his
five factors, which have general applicability in the context of techno-
logical change, to be convincing if not very exceptional.His method
of moving from the specific to the general is more informative and
provides a more satisfactory outcome than, for example, the Healy
paper. This is no criticism of the latter since it is always easier to discuss
a specific problem whose nature is clear and in which the direction of
desirable change is uncomplicated by doubt.
It is obvious that ignorance expedites vested interest and bias while
knowledge at least restricts unwavering irrationality.Dunlop's dis-
cussion is reassuring in this regard although I suspect that he is not
confident that strikes can be averted despite careful analysis of the
manpower structure. We can hope that our findings will at least
guide public policy and attitudes on to approximately correct paths
despite innumerable small instances of inefficiency, waste, and inequity.
We can also hope that needed changes can be induced by our work
before the crisis stage is reached.MANPOWER IN RR OPERATING CLASSIFICATIONS 437
THOR HULTGREN, National Bureau of Economic Research
A currently important transportation problem is that of finding a
useful place for labor displaced by technological improvement. The
problem is especially acute in the case of train and engine labor. The
Diesel locomotive has made the usefulness of a whole craft, the firemen,
questionable. The system of wage payment in train and engine service
is peculiar.And the industry isrelatively stagnant in size.The
Presidential Railroad Commission of which John T. Dunlop was a
member developed a large body of data bearing on the problem.
In his paper, Dunlop considers six lines of policy. One is reliance on
attrition—no separation from service except that occasioned by death,
retirement, voluntary quitting, dismissal for cause, and perhaps decline
of traffic. On the whole, Dunlop rejects that solution, which would
greatly delay the realization of economies. He favors broader seniority
districts, compulsory retirement at age 65,relianceon additional
workers rather than overtime, training for other jobs before present
jobs are lost, and protracted separation allowances. Broader districts
would certainly often be better than firing old employees on one part
of a railroad system while hiring new ones on another part. Because
a railroad isterritorially far-flung, however, wider districts would
sometimes involve considerable social dislocation. As to hiring ad-
ditional workers rather than paying overtime, it is often not feasible to
replace a train crew at the end of straight time. Some people would
question whether workers should be thrown out of the labor force
automatically at any specified age; this is a growing problem in the
economy at large. Dunlop points out, however, that train and engine
workers are unusually old and do not possess broadly transferable
skills.He draws an ingenious contrast between locomotive firemen
and boilermakers in railroad repair shops. Diesels threatened the jobs
of both, but boilermakers had a transferable skill and put up much less
resistance.
For firemen employed less than ten years, PRC recommended
separation., with allowances to be paid for periods as long as four years,
depending on length of service. Similar allowances have been required
by the Interstate Commerce Commission for workers displaced by
railway mergers.Railroad managers complain that there are no
analogous arrangements in other industries. Certainly it is not fair to
cast the entire social burden of transition on the displaced workers.
On the other hand, law and policy urge the railroads to be efficient;
the ICC is told to consider efficiency when passing judgment on the438 MANPOWER IN RR OPERATING CLASSIFICATIONS
level of rates and fares. Should railroads nevertheless be deprived for
a time of the benefits of efficiency? if displaced workers are not ab-
sorbed elsewhere, that would seem to indicate imperfection in the labor
market, a responsibility of the economic community at large. However,
when separation results from greater efficiency, there is at least new
income out of which allowances may be paid.In contrast, when the
Rutland went out of business, the ICC refused to burden the estate of
the defunct railroad with separation allowances.
Dunlop draws an optimistic lesson from history.I can think of a
work rule in newspaper printing that has seemed to "frustrate techno-
logical change" for at least two decades. How long is long?